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Abstract: This study aims at identifying the material scope 
of religious preaching and sermon; and describing the 
multicultural aspects conveyed in the religious preaching 
and sermon. As the subject of analysis, it focuses on 
religious sermons delivered by preachers in Surakarta, 
Central Java, Indonesia. Using content and discourse 
analysis, this study finds that: the diversity of the society 
gains little attention by different religious preachers; instead 
of multicultural values, the religious preaches and sermons 
contain some anti-multicultural values, such as self-
righteousness, prejudices and stereotypes of other groups; 
the subject of religious preaches and sermons implied the 
intensity of the purification movement; and the 
development of Islam implies the tendency of religious 
radicalism as reflected in the hostility towards the local 
culture, foreign people, and non-Muslims. 
Keywords: Multiculturalism, Islam, Religious preaching, 
Radicalism, Salafism. 
Introduction 
Surakarta or Solo is often assumed to have a great cultural values 
(adhiluhung) manifested in everyday life of the people, so that people in 
Surakarta—“Wong Solo” or “Piyayi Sala”—is said as one who has 
exquisite manner, soft-spoken speech, great aristocratic 
accomplishment and doesn't like violence. Assumption about the 
strength of Javanese culture among Surakarta society bears stereotype 
about diversity pattern of the people in Surakarta, which is assumed to 
be identical with religious practices, either Islam or non-Islam, in 
moderate, or even tends to mixed or colored by Javanese culture. 
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Up to the end of 1970s, Solonese, including the Muslims, preferred 
to identify themselves as a Javanese than as the follower of certain 
religion, especially because Muslims in Surakarta didn’t want to be 
referred to as the fundamentalist by the government. Though intensity 
of Christianization movement worried Muslims, Surakarta had never 
had history of religious fanaticism and radicalism both leading to 
interfaith and intrafaith conflict. 
However, since the beginning of 1980s, Surakarta, as in a number 
of other towns in Indonesia, also showed existence of new enthusiasm 
of public in Islamic religiosity. Phenomenon of jilbab (headscarf) 
among Muslim women, for example, started popping out among 
Muslim students, especially because they were influenced by activists 
of Masjid Salman ITB (Technology Institute of Bandung). By the end 
of the 1980s, the visibility of jilbab was no longer limited to students, 
but also among Muslim women in general. Wearing jilbab as part of 
Muslim women identity became increasingly fashionable especially 
since the appearance of ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals) which was considered by some of Muslims to be one of 
“elite” Islamic organization. Besides, in Surakarta there were also some 
other activities which can indicate enthusiasm on religiosity such as 
mosque adolescent organizations (remaja masjid), various TPA (Kinder 
Garden for Quranic Teaching), religious teaching in mosques and 
majelis taklim (religious teaching circle), religious teaching in offices, and 
phenomenon of the appearance of what so-called the Jaulah. 
At certain degree, religious enthusiasm led to shape militant 
“exclusive” groups, with their own religious pattern and certain 
religious behavior. MTA (Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur’an), DDII (Dewan 
Dakwah Islam Indonesia), LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia), majelis taklim in Gumuk, majelis taklim in Penumping, beside 
majelis taklim managed by Muhammadiyah and NU, are among this 
kind of “exclusive” groups. Exclusive impression was seen because 
they tended to be suspicious to each other. Lack of communications 
and cooperation between religious groups in Surakarta are noticeable, 
for example, in the event of s}ala>h, either `I <d al-Fit }r or `I <d al-Ad }h }a>, in 
Manahan square, which is a strategic place for big events. When the 
field was occupied by jama>`ah MTA from various areas of Surakarta, 
some of publics around the square did not want to joint praying with 
them, but making their jama>` ah ouside and around the field. One of 
their reasons why they do not want to join with jama>`ah MTA is that 
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they assume that jama >` ah MTA had been manipulated by political 
mission of the New Order government. 
Islamic Radicalism in Surakarta started to emerge and then was 
widely covered by international media since the collapse of Soeharto’s 
New Order regime. Most Muslims in Surakarta were encouraged to say 
that they are Muslims and ready to die for Islam. Various Islamic mass-
organization also formed satgas (paramilitary wing) such as Hizbullah, 
Jundullah, Barisan Bismillah, KOKAM (Komando Kesiapsiagaan 
Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah), and Laskar Jihad (Ahlu al-Sunnah 
wa al-Jama'ah), which is not just for holding their interests, but 
explicitly express themselves as an advocate of the united Islam. At 
certain time, when they feel that their interests are disturbed, some 
mass organization coalesced, such as in the case of Front Pembela 
Islam Surakarta (FPIS) or Aliansi Umat Islam Surakarta (AUIS), 
without paying attention to their own respective interest.  
There were rallies and actions done by some mass organizations, 
such as the protest to Priest Wilson, action demanded the owners of 
discotheques and night clubs to close their business which then 
popular with the term “sweeping”, action opposed the United States 
military invasion to Iraq, and action demanding the application of 
Islamic Shari >‘ah in legislation system in Indonesia. 
Collision almost happened between members of Islamic mass 
organizations together with Muslim students merged into Front 
Pemuda Islam Surakarta (FPIS) and a number of non-Muslim 
community which was supported by paramilitary PDI Perjuangan 
when Islamic mass organizations protested Pendeta (Priest) Wilson in 
the interactive dialogue with the theme “Efforts in Overcoming 
Conflict of Interfaith Community” broadcasted by Radio PTPN 
Rasitania Surakarta, 3 March 2000. This interactive Dialogue guided by 
Jeffrey Ohio, one of the broadcasters, presented the guest speaker 
Priest Ahmad Wilson from Surakarta. Protest to Priest Ahmad Wilson 
was triggered by the statement in the dialogue that before becoming 
Muslim, Prophet Muhammad was a Christian. Priest Wilson then was 
reported to the police by a number of Muslim figures and some 
members of DPRD (District House of Representatives) from PPP, 
PKB, PK, and PAN, so that the radio stopped broadcasting for few 
days because some of the electronic equipments were confiscated by 
the police as evidence. But the interesting thing in this case is that 
among the Priest Wilson’s lawyers were personnel from Biro Konsultasi 
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dan Bantuan Hukum (BKBH) of Muhammadiyah University of 
Surakarta. Protest to Pendeta Wilson was merely an event arising from 
interfaith conflict potency especially since most Muslims in Surakarta 
worried about the aggressive movement of Christianization in 
Surakarta in the past two decades. 
In Ramadhan 2000, Aliansi Ummat Islam Surakarta (AUIS) which 
was the alliance from around 25 political parties paramilitary, lasykar 
and mass organizations such as Zulfikar, Al-Islah, Salamah, Teratai Emas, 
Honggo Dermo, Jundullah, Hizbullah, Hamas, Hawariyyun, Kopashad, 
Forkami, FPIS, KOKAM, FKAM, and MTA, gave ultimatum to the 
discotheque and night club entrepreneurs to close their business during 
Ramadhan. Besides, they also did sweeping to some nightspots which 
were unwilling to pay attention to the ultimatum and almost caused the 
mass conflict between the member of mass organizations and the 
entrepreneur supporters, mainly consisted of PDIP’s paramilitary and 
people who were considered as abangan (nominal Muslims). Similar 
collision was also unavoidable between the entrepreneur supporters 
and the santri (students) of Pondok Pesantren Al-Mukmin Ngruki, who 
were considered as one of breeding center of Muslim militants. 
On Sunday 29 October 2001, at least 150 masses out of four 
Islamic mass organizations, namely Brigade Hizbullah, Korp Hizbullah 
Divisi Sunan Bonang, Lasykar Jundullah, and KOKAM did 
“sweeping” several hotels in Surakarta such as Novotel, Agas, Quality, 
Sahid Raya, and Lor In, looking for Americans. Such an action was 
done by Islamic mass organizations as a form of their protest to the 
US Government for military invasion to Iraq. 
The climax action exposing the phenomenon of radical Islamism 
in Surakarta was increasingly noticeable after the Bali bombing on 12 
October 2001. Surakarta was considered to be the breeding ground of 
radical Islam having network with Jama’ah Islamiyah and international 
terrorist network, including with KMMM (Kelompok Militer Muslim 
Malaysia). The perpetrators of Bali bombing and of various other 
places were assumed to have interrelationship with Ustadz Abubakar 
Ba'asyir who serves as the leader of Pondok Pesantren Al-Mukmin 
Ngruki and at the same time as Imam Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 
(MMI), known as Islamic group of hardliners. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, with 
Abdullah Sungkar, both were the founders of Pondok Pesantren Al-
Mukmin Ngruki and having committed to Darul Islam in 1950s, tried 
to build Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia) by 
  
Zakiyuddin Baidhawy 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 04, Number 02, December 2010 
272 
developing Jama’ah Islamiyah and built Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia in 
Yogyakarta in 2000. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was assumed to have relation 
to a number of Bali bombers, like Hambali or Ridwan Isamuddin from 
Cianjur Jawa Barat; Fathurraman al-Gozi from Madiun, former santri 
Pondok Ngruki; Abu Jibril or Fikiruddin Muqti or Mohammad Iqbal 
bin Abdurrahman from Lombok; and Agus Dwikarna who was caught 
in the Philippine for having explosive materials. 
The above elaboration indicates that Surakarta represents a plural 
and multicultural reality. On the one hand, there is moderate Islam, but 
there is also extremist or radical Islam (hardliners), on the other. Even 
Surakarta has not had history of social conflict among Muslims, 
various religious patterns can lead to conflict, especially when the 
militancy and radicalization ideology is employed for the purpose of 
political interests. Nevertheless, such a religious diversity is also able to 
create a space for dialogue and works together among Muslims. 
This study aims at analyzing how certain values were developed 
and contributed to the making of radical Islamism which led to social 
fragmentation. One of the hypotheses throughout this paper is that 
religious congregation (jama’ah pengajian) in various mosques and majelis 
taklim in Surakarta deliver more normative materials, emphasizing 
individual pietism than social one, and unable to address issues related 
to living together in pluralism and multiculturalism. The religious 
materials of this kind in turn could not create space for tolerance to all 
differences, either in terms of ethnicity, religion or culture. 
Discourse about Multiculturalism 
The existence of society with various individuals coming from 
different background of religion, ethnicity, language, and race are not 
typical of the West. History has noted that the phenomenon is the 
reality that happened in the past. Robert W. Hefner for example, 
affirms that social phenomenon with religious diversity, ethnicity, 
language, and race in a state or empire have ever happened in Mughal 
India, Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, West African Empire, and 
even Majapahit Empire in Java.1 So, it can be argued that 
multiculturalism is no longer unique at this modern century. 
It must be admitted that as a discourse, the term multiculturalism 
has just been introduced in modern times. Historically, the term first of 
                                                 
1 Robert W. Hefner, “Civil Society and Democracy.” Journal, May-June, vol. 2, no. 3 
(1998), p. 6, in http://civnet.org/journal/issue7/ftrhefn.htm.   
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all was introduced in the West –especially in the US and West 
European countries– in the 1970s. Such discourse arises as the 
response to the discrimination by a group of majority to that of 
minority in the 1950s. In those years, the only culture that was 
recognized in the US and West European countries was the Christian 
culture of white skin. The other groups in the society were grouped as 
minority with only limited rights. As a result, various distortions 
occurred to claim equal right for minority community and a dark skin 
and color people which started emerging by the end of 1950s. The 
climax was in the 1960s when the access of the dark and color people 
was limited in the public sphere by the white. At the same time there 
emerged struggles of civil rights through various activities and rallies, 
which assisted them liberate from marginalized position to the equal 
one in various work areas and business.2 
The concept of multiculturalism was introduced in America and 
West European countries by intellectuals, in order to increase human 
dignity and their humanity. Multiculturalism contains the recognition 
of difference in equality, either individually or collectively. Here, 
certain community was seen as a civilized community the pattern of 
which is like a mosaic. In a mosaic there are many cultures from micro 
cultures which form larger community (macro culture).3 
In contemporary discourse, multiculturalism is initially 
comprehended as term containing race, gender, ethnic, class, and 
alternative of life style. This definition has just limited to diversity only, 
and has not touched at other dimension required the diversity of 
individuals. In this case, Donna M. Gollnick’s concept is more 
adequate. He perceives multiculturalism as “situation where someone 
has knowledge and develops skill which are needed to enjoy and 
communicate effectively: (1) to others coming from different cultures, 
and (2) in so many situation that entangles group of people with 
different cultural background.”4 Gollnick’s concept is said to be more 
                                                 
2 Parsudi Suparlan, “Menuju Masyarakat Indonesia yang Multikultural” (Paper 
presented at Simposium Internasional ke-3, Jurnal Antropologi Indonesia, Denpasar 
Bali, 16-21 Juli 2002), pp. 2-3.  
3 Donna M. Gollnick, “Culture and Pluralism,” in Donna M. Gollnick and Philip C. 
Chinn, Multicultural Education in Pluralistic Society (London: The CV Mosby Company, 
1983), p. 23. 
4 Gollnick, “Culture and Pluralism,” pp. 22-3. 
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adequate as it has given possible space to live together between 
different individuals of ethnic background, culture, and religion. 
Dealing with such opportunity for living together, Maman S. 
Mahayana’s concept (2001) in his work Sastra Indonesia dalam Perspektitf 
Multikulturalisme (Indonesian Art in Multiculturalism Perspective) is 
clearer. According to him, in social life, the presence of 
multiculturalism holds two things: (1) that any group of culture can 
socially be realized, represented, and can live together; and (2) that 
racism can be reduced through building the positive image of ethnic 
diversity and through recognition of other cultures. Mahayana’s 
concept does not only guarantee the possibility to coexist in diversity, 
but also open to mutual-respect in ethnic, language, culture, and 
religion diversity. Mahayana’s concept, nevertheless, doesn't address 
explicitly the mutual-respect between different individuals and group 
of peoples.5 
It is within this context that Nino Ricci  proposes more 
comprehensive concept of multiculturalism. He states that there are 
three important elements in multiculturalism: diversity, equality, and 
respect.6 In line with Ricci, Lawrence A. Blum maintains that in 
multiculturalism there are three values namely: realizing one’s cultural 
identity, studying and assessing other cultural heritage; respecting and 
wishful to comprehend and gets wise to (and from) other cultures 
besides their own culture; and assessing and enjoying with difference 
of cultures in itself; that is viewing existence of different culture groups 
in society as positive kindness to be recognised and maintained.7 
It has been mentioned previously that multiculturalism is as a 
matter fact that has existed in some (monarchic) states during the past, 
including in the Islamic world. In addition to Hefner, there are some 
scholars who are focusing their study on multiculturalism in Islam. 
Sachedina maps all important concepts of political Islam which can 
                                                 
5 Maman S. Mahayana, “Sastra Indonesia dalam Perspektif Multikulturalisme,” Media 
Indonesia Edisi Akhir Tahun 2001: Satu Indonesia. http://www.mediaindo.co.id/cetak/ 
berita.asp?ID=2001121011264808. 
6 Nino Ricci, “What is Multiculturalism?,” Journal of Canadian Heritage Multiculturalism, 
vol. March 21, 2002, http://www.pch.gc.ca/multi/what-multi-e.shtml. 
7 Lawrence A. Blum, “Antirasisme, Multikulturalisme, dan Komunitas antar Ras: Tiga 
Nilai yang Bersifat Mendidik bagi Sebuah Masyarakat Multikultural,” in Larry May, 
Etika Terapan I Sebuah Pendekatan Multikultural, trans. by Sinta Carolina, et al. 
(Jogjakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2001), p. 19.  
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improve the relation of humanities, both between nations and among 
nations. The purpose is to find the normative elements of Muslim 
tradition and its application to different cultures which is relevant to 
the pluralistic world of the 21st century. According to him, socio-
political dimension of doctrine and practice in Islamic history can be 
mapped into three groups as follows: socio-political dimension in the 
form of the unity of humankind, socio-political dimension in the form 
of competition in good works, and socio-political dimension in the 
form of forgiveness toward humankind.8 
Meanwhile, Amir Hussain proposes that Islam was firstly 
presented and grew at pluralistic and polytheistic society. Either in 
Mecca or in Medina, Islam was initially religious minority among 
majorities of Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. The difference was 
that in Mecca, Islam occupied position of the oppressed minority and 
marginalized, while in Medina, though occupied position of minority, 
Islam can live peacefully with non-Muslim community. As open 
missionary religion, Islam can grow and has a large number of 
followers that continuously develops its openness and the Prophet 
Muhammad always implements interfaith dialogue.9 
On the other side, Islamic civilization is formed by the cultural 
diversity, such as Arab, Persian, Turkish, Bengal, Punjab, Sindhi, 
Maghribi (North African), West African, Middle Asian, and South-East 
Asian. Islamic civilization involving those cultures gives space and the 
same attention to Muslim and non-Muslim people, though Muslims 
plays dominant position. Even, in certain countries, Islamic Shari >` ah is 
not the state constitution. Andalusia and India are two important 
examples of state of which peoples are majority Muslims but are not 
managed by Shari>` ah. Lawrence also places al-Biruni as an important 
figure of multiculturalism that studying Arabic, Persian, Greek, and 
Sanskrit languages and cultures. He wrote 125 books using Persian and 
Arabic language. 
By combining concepts of multiculturalism proposed by Gollnick, 
Mahayana, Ricci, and Blum on one side, and multiculturalism theories 
in Islam described by Sachedina and Hussain on the other side, it can 
                                                 
8 Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 11. 
9 Amir Hussain, “Muslims, Pluralism, and Interfaith Dialog,” in Omid Safi (ed.), 
Progressive Muslims: on Justice, Gender, and Pluralism (Oxford: Bell & Bain Ltd., 2003), pp. 
253-8.  
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be affirmed that multiculturalism consists of universal values of 
humanity. The universal values of humanity in multiculturalism covers 
unity of humankind, competition in good works, forgiveness toward 
humankind, dialogue or co-existence and pro-existence, living together, 
equality or egalitarianism, mutual-understanding, mutual-respect, 
mutual-trust, positive thinking, tolerance, reconciliation, conflict 
resolution, peace, non-violence, and social justice. 
Islam considers that universal values of humanity in the 
multiculturalism derived from divine revelation, whereas contemporary 
multiculturalism in Western views such values as coming from logics 
and philosophy of humanity. 
Hegemony of Islam and Javanese Culture 
Religious preaching (pengajian) is basically a socialization process 
and internalization of values giving contribution in constructing the 
religious pattern of society. Therefore, identification on tendency of 
this religious preaching can assist to explain a number of phenomena 
considered as radicalization of society. 
However, Muslims’ dynamics in Surakarta is not an independent 
case. Up to certain level, this dynamics has close relation to the 
national dynamics of Indonesia, especially to the dialectic between 
Islam and the State, such as the movements proposing Shari‘a as 
positive law, the mushrooming of Islamic political parties, horizontal 
conflicts among Muslim and non-Muslim community, the arrest of 
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and the bombings in several places in this country; 
beside the dynamics of global politics, such as relation between Islam 
and Western countries, the September 11 tragedy, and the US military 
invasion to Iraq. 
There are ten groups (jama >`ah) of religious gathering as the focus 
of this study; those are: Al-Riyadhah, Al-Mufassir, Al-Jami', Al-Ishlah, 
Al-Muslim, Al-Kabir, Al-Maghrib, Al-Ashalah, Al-Sunnah, and Al-
Qaim. Jama>` ah of those religious gathering are spread over in various 
locations in Surakarta, and at certain level they represent various 
Islamic institutions and religious patterns. Those ten organizations or 
jama>` ah are divided into four groups: (1) jama>` ah with small member 
(less than 40 members) consisting of adult and elder people; (2) jama>` ah 
with bigger participants (hundreds) and partly the young and; (3) 
jama>` ah which is relatively homogeneous and mono-cultural as the 
result of their Javanese ethnicity and their participation to religious 
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gathering of which speakers have the same religious pattern, that is 
“Islam salafi”; and (4) jama >`ah coming from various background in 
ethnic, level of socio-economy, socio-religious organization, and also 
political party, so that they are relatively more liquid and multicultural 
in ideological orientation. 
From the above jama>` ah, there are four jama >` ah (Al-Ishlah, Al-Jami, 
Al-Mufassir, Al-Ashalah) whose mission is the same, that is teaching 
Islam based on the purity of tawh }i >d (the Oneness of God). They 
formed certain network for the local religious gathering, which is not 
structural but coordinative, especially through figures that at the same 
time become the guest speakers in some other gatherings. At least 
there are four factors bringing them into one. Firstly, the four jama >` ahs 
have similar religious pattern as in Al-Ishlah called with “Islam Salafi”. 
Ustaz Mu'allim as one of important figures in the network of jama >`ah 
always avoids labeling which shows categorization. He calls it with 
term “Dien al-Islam” or “Al-Islam only”. According to this figure, 
Islam having certain character or categorization is not the true Islam. 
Second, the four jama>`ahs have political orientation on 
“Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah” (Islamic brotherhood) that aims at unifying 
Muslims in terms of politics and power. Ideologically, the four jama>` ahs 
have close relation to Al-Muslim under the leader Kyai Ahmad before 
the independence of Republic of Indonesia that was inspired by 
movement of pan-Islamism in Saudi Arabia in the early 20th century. 
Third, the important figures in those four jama>` ahs have the same 
learning tradition, namely tradition of tafsi>r (Qur’anic interpretation). 
Most reference delivered by the preachers in the four jama>` ah are 
books of tafsi>r (such as Tafsi >r al-Qurt }ubi >, Tafsi>r Ibnu Kathi>r, Tafsi >r Ibnu 
`Abba>s, Tafsi>r al-Mana >r, Tafsir al-Mara>ghi>, and Tafsi >r Sayyid Qut }b) and 
H{adi >th, especially kutub al-sittah (S {ah}i >h} al-Bukha>ri >, S {ah}i >h} Muslim, Sunan 
Abi > Da >wu >d, Sunan al-Tirmidhi >, Sunan al-Nasa >'i>, and Sunan Ibn Ma>jah), 
beside H{adi >ths on fiqh, such as Bulu>gh al-Mara >m, Nayl alAwt }a>r, and 
Iba>nat al-Ah}ka>m. 
Fourth, the four jama>` ahs have the same mission of purifying the 
Islamic teachings. The main target of those jama >`ahs is Muslim who is 
considered to have been contaminated by elements coming from 
outside of Islam. 
The above explanation shows that the purity of Islamic teaching 
becomes the major stream constituting the institutional mission of 
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most jama>` ah. This emphasis cannot be separated from broader context 
of dialectic between Islam and Javanese culture. Muslim Community 
lies in central point of trade-offs between Islam and Javanese culture. 
Therefore, practices containing symbols of Islamic hegemony and of 
Javanese culture, such as rites de passage, which is still becoming the 
essential part of people’s life, become the important target of 
missionary for most of jama >` ah gatherings. 
The growth of jama >` ah in Al-Mufassir, Al-Ishlah, Al-Jami', Al-
Ashlah, and Al-Maghrib in certain level, is illustrating the manifestation 
of “divorce” or at least of the gap between Islam and Javanese culture. 
Therefore, some traditions in Javanese culture, including some 
practices carried out by Kasunanan in mosque Al-Kabir, become the 
main topics in these jama>` ah. 
One of the factors contributing to the negative perception and 
even negative attitude of Islam towards Javanese culture is that some 
of Javanese art is applied as communist propaganda and adopted by 
Church and Christian institutions as media for missionary, so that 
various jama >` ah treats Javanese culture as threatening the Islamic 
teaching, as communism and Christianity do. 
Only jama>` ah Al-Kabir received dialogue between Islam and 
Javanese culture. Today, Al-Kabir is managed together by The Ministry 
of Religious affairs, MUI, and Pangageng Parentah (Sultan of) Karaton 
Kasunanan. In addition, the official members and guest speakers in Al-
Kabir are more dominated by the so-called “traditionalist Muslims.” 
Domination of religious pattern of the official member and guest 
speakers are based on certain considerations because Kasunanan itself, 
which historically is the owner of the mosque Al-Kabir, is aware of the 
existence of other Islamic institutions that are against their tradition, so 
that Kasunanan until now shows the preference on the traditionalists 
than other Islamic organizations. 
This implies the potential “contestation of power” in jama>` ah Al-
Kabir, which sooner or later could “erupt” either openly or silently. Al-
Kabir is strategic place and becomes the central point of hegemony 
among modernist Islam, traditional Islam, Karaton, and the 
government. Dominating Al-Kabir can become an important symbol 
of supremacy over one to another.  
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Religious Radicalization  
The popular themes taught in religious gatherings of jama >` ah 
basically can be categorized into five: (1) individual piety, (2) social 
devout, (3) values of internal multiculturalism, (4) values of external 
multiculturalism, and (5) stigma to others and terrorism. 
Themes in various jama>` ah emphasize more on individual and 
social piety, especially among members of Muslims community. Topics 
on social interaction with others, especially non-Muslim, receives less 
attention, so that preaching materials dealing with multiculturalism 
values are relatively little in number compared to the piety, which is 
related to akhla>q, fiqh al-`iba>dah or tawh }i >d. 
There are 16 values of multiculturalism in Islam that can be found 
in various jama >` ah and in various portion. The values that appear in 
religious preaching are unity of humankind, competition in good 
works, forgiveness toward humankind, living together, equality, 
mutual-understanding, mutual-respect, mutual-trust, positive thinking, 
tolerance, reconciliation, peace, non-violence, social justice. 
Multicultural values which do not appear in religious preaching are 
dialogue or co-existence and pro-existence, and conflict resolution. 
The most frequent values of multiculturalism are mutual-respect 
and mutual-understanding. The numerous multicultural values that can 
be found in jama >` ah Al-Riyadhah, among others, are unity of 
humankind, competition in good work, living together, mutual-
understanding, mutual-respect, mutual-trust, positive thinking, peace, 
non-violence, and social justice. Equality, mutual understanding, 
mutual-respect, tolerance, peace, and non-violence can be found in 
jama>` ah Al-Mufassir. Forgiveness toward humankind, mutual- 
understanding, mutual-respect, tolerance, reconciliation, peace, and 
non-violence can be found in jama>` ah Al-Kabir. Living together, 
equality, mutual-understanding, mutual-respect, sincerity, positive 
thinking, and tolerance are in jama>` ah Al-Maghrib. Unity of 
humankind, competition in good work, and living together are to be 
found in jama>` ah Al-Sunnah. Living together, mutual-respect, and 
tolerance are the characters of jama >` ah Al-Ashalah. In jama>` ah Al-Jami’ 
there are mutual-understanding and mutual-respect. Inside jama>` ah Al-
Muslim there are peace and non-violence values. 
Some of values conveyed to various jama >` ah, especially Al-
Riyadhah, Al-Maghrib, and Al-Sunnah are the multicultural values 
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involving non-Muslim community (inter-religious relation); which is 
taught in jama>`ah Al-Mufassir and Al-Jami’ are the multicultural values 
of intra-Muslim community; while multicultural values given in jama>` ah 
Al-Kabir covers the two—internal and external multiculturalism—
either Muslim and non-Muslim community, or intra-Muslim 
community itself. 
Beside multicultural values, some religious gatherings also convey 
anti-multiculturalism sentiment, such as self-righteousness (only Islam 
or their version of interpretation is correct), prejudices and stereotypes 
(negative thinking of others, especially the Jews and Christians, and 
other groups of Muslim, stigma and judgment (labeling that the other 
is wrong and negative), exclusivism (suggestion not to contact to 
others), in-group arrogance (that their own group is more superior 
than the others), defense toward violence (sympathy to violence which 
has been done by the “right” people), and defense to the disobedience 
(sympathy to the action of state transgression which has been done by 
“right” people). 
Anti-multicultural values found in jama >` ah Al-Jami' consist of truth 
claim, prejudice, stigma, judgment, negative thinking, defense toward 
violence, and defense to the disobedience. Values found in jama >` ah Al-
Kabir cover self-righteousness, prejudice, stigma, exclusivism, and 
defense toward violence. Values found in jama>` ah Al-Mufassir cover 
truth claim, prejudice, stigma, and judgment, and in-group arrogance. 
Values found in jama>` ah Al-Ishlah cover self-righteousness, prejudice 
and stereotype, stigma, and negative thinking. 
There is no any multicultural value found in Al-Qaim and Al-
Ishlah. Meanwhile, dealing with Muslim-non-Muslim relation, these 
two jama >` ah are very different. Al-Qaim doesn't convey multicultural 
values because it doesn’t discuss the relation between Muslim and non-
Muslim; while Al-Ishlah discusses the relationship between Muslim 
and non-Muslim but they are concerned with anti-multicultural values. 
Self-righteousness can be found in some big jama >`ah, they are Al-
Riyadhah, Al-Mufassir, Al-Jami', Al-Ishlah, Al-Kabir, and Al-Ashalah. 
Prejudice and stereotype also emerged in part of the big jama’ah except 
Al-Riyadhah, Al-Muslim, Al-Maghrib, and Al-Qa'im. While stigma and 
judgment existed in jama>` ah Al-Mufassir, Al-Jami', Al-Kabir, and Al-
Ashalah; exclusivism appeared in jama>` ah Al-Ishlah and Al-Kabir; 
negative thinking can be found as well in jama >` ah Al-Jami' and Al-
Ashalah; in-group arrogance were in Al-Mufassir and Al-Maghrib; 
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defense over violence can be found in Al-Jami' and Al-Kabir; and 
defense to the disobedience was found in Al-Jami'. 
After MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) prohibited secularism, 
pluralism and liberalism, most of all religious gatherings condemn 
those who carried such ideologies as ‘syphilis’. Liberal Islam Network 
(JIL) and Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM) were 
slandered everywhere.  
Mapping the content of religious gatherings implies the dynamics 
of social relationship in society, either intra-Muslim communities or 
between Muslims and non-Muslim communities showing continuity 
and change. Firstly, in most Muslim community, there is a process of 
religious radicalization through self-righteousness which gives less 
appreciation to diversity and practice of living together. This claim 
emerges especially in the discussion about Islam in relation to other 
religious teachings and certain values assumed to derive from non-
Islam, especially Javanese culture. This claim tends to lead a dialectics 
between Islam and Javanese culture into disharmony. Positive attitude 
towards Javanese culture can be found only in jama >` ah Al-Kabir. 
Javanese Culture doesn't become the value reference of society, but it 
becomes target of criticism and to be blamed for impurity of Islamic 
teaching. This process could imply the limited forms of cooperation 
between religious institution of Islam and Javanese culture.  
Second, some Muslims experience radicalization process through 
Islam Salafi which is considered as the ideal and pure Islamic teaching. 
This radicalization is pioneered by the new jama >` ah (after the year 
1970), such as Al-Jami', Al-Mufassir, and Al-Ashalah. This 
radicalization implies continued development phase of purification 
movement since the beginning of 20th century, along with the birth of 
Muhammadiyah which was then followed by other organizations. The 
appearance of new organizations is not solely an imitation process, but 
is reaction to Muhammadiyah that was regarded by them as less 
assertive in responding a number of certain contemporary issues. 
Third, there is tendency to identify Islam as political power which 
can be mobilized for certain purposes. This political power can’t be 
viewed in terms of political party or power, but as bargaining power or 
pressure group, as represented by Front Pembela Islam Surakarta 
(FPIS) demanding the city government to close the entertainment 
spots during Ramadhan, ‘sweeping’ the Americans in a number of 
hotels in Surakarta as a protest to American invasion to Iraq, and 
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action of sealing Radio PTPN as a protest to Priest Wilson who was 
assumed to have offended Islam. 
Thereby, for some Muslims in Surakarta, orientation towards Islam 
Salafi is a need for identity affirmation. Identity affirmation is not 
merely required in relation to Muslim and non-Muslim, or Islam and 
Javanese culture, but also in relation to global power which is assumed 
to be undermining Islam. 
The Stricture of Multiculturalism Space 
Religious orientation of jama>` ah can be distinguished into general 
and specific orientation. General orientation is the characteristics of all 
organizations or jama >` ah: directed to teaching and practicing Islamic 
doctrine in everyday life, either individually or collectively; most 
preaching materials are general (without gradation or specification) 
and; drifted towards undertaking the mission of amr bi al-ma`ru >f wa nahy 
`an al-munkar (commanding good and forbidding wrong) to Muslims 
and not non-Muslims alike; and it doesn’t have any certain mission 
target, such as children, adolescents, the mu’allaf (converts), group of 
preachers, or other special target audience. 
Specific orientation of jama>` ah can be classified into four 
categories: (1) to facilitate religious learning, to give opportunity to 
Muslims to learn Islam by providing source of learning such as kyai, 
ustadh, and holy book, and place (jama >` ah Al-Riyadhah, Al-Qaim, Al-
Sunnah, and Al-Muslim); (2) to establish harmony between Islamic 
teachings and Javanese culture, which is only met in jama >` ah Al-Kabir; 
(3) to purify Islamic teaching from non-Islam elements, either coming 
from pre-Islam beliefs (Hinduism, Buddhism, animism and 
dynamism), and also practice of traditions in Javanese culture (jama >` ah 
Al-Mufassir, Al-Jami', Al-Ishlah, and Al-Maghrib); and (4) to 
strengthen the understanding of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama >` ah and 
Javanese culture (Al-Jama’ah Al-Ashalah), by returning to the genuine 
Islamic teaching. This is due to the idea that Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-
Jama>` ah at certain level has deviated from Islamic teaching as practiced 
by Rasulullah and his friends (al-Salaf al-S {a>lih}). One of the factors 
contributing this deviation is that Javanese culture is assumed to have 
rooted to religions before Islam (Hinduism, Buddhism, animism and 
dynamism). This jama>` ah also claims that Islam is “Al-Islam”, as taught 
in this jama>` ah. Other forms of Islam, with additional terms (such as 
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liberal Islam, secular Islam, progressive Islam, moderate Islam, and 
others) are not the true Islam. 
The above explanation indicates that the dialectics between Islam 
and Javanese culture continues to exist and can lead to more explicit 
“conflict”. In the early of 21st century, when Muhammadiyah was 
founded, the dialectics between Islam and Javanese culture began 
taking place in a subtle “conflict”, especially when Muhammadiyah 
expressed “fights” against takhayyul (heresy), bid’ah (innovation), and 
khura>fah (superstition). This step then was followed by some other 
organizations afterwards, such as Al-Ishlah and Al-Mufassir, and the 
metamorphosis of Al-Jami' after 1970s led by Usta>dh Mu'allim. 
Javanese Culture, historically has extraordinary flexibility in 
naturalization of other cultural elements, including from Islam, now 
seems fatigue when confronting to modernist Islam orienting to 
purification. On the one hand, modernist Islam becomes stronger, 
especially when supported by various schools and majlis taklim carried 
out by modernist Muslim organizations. On the other hand, Karaton is 
not able to maintain harmony of Islam and Javanese culture, whereas 
institutions of Javanese culture started losing their devotee along with 
modernization emphasizing at values of rationality and pragmatism. 
Pesantren (boarding school) Al-Muslim, which historically has 
closed relation to Karaton Kasunanan and education institute of 
Manba’ al-‘Ulum, causing them to have high appreciation at Javanese 
culture, underwent such metamorphosis to be an ideological 
organization, but then it was divided. One of their factions now 
becomes Al-Muslim education institute. 
Though people still use the Javanese language in majlis taklim in 
villages, including Al-Qaim and Al-Muslim, the preaching material 
doesn't relate to Javanese culture. It means that the usage of local 
language in some preaching doesn't have anything to do with harmony 
between Islam and Javanese culture, but relate to the background of 
the preachers and members of jama >`ah (usually the old). 
Meanwhile, orientation of purifying Islamic teaching grows fast 
and becomes the important issue in various jama>` ah, having great 
number of members, such as Al-Mufassir, Al-Jami', and Al-Ashalah, or 
jama>` ah who become part of national organization, such as Al-Ishlah 
and Al-Maghrib. Orientation of this purification crystallizes more and 
becomes more radical, that is Salafi Islam as reflected in Al-Ashalah. 
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Popularity of purification oriented jama >`ah shows uniformity of 
Islam among Muslims, which in the future enables to reach harmony, 
so that differences among them, often blocks in unifying the ummah, 
relatively become fewer. Besides, the agenda to straighten Javanese 
culture in purification oriented jama >` ah Al-Ashalah is a confirmation of 
their position vis a vis Javanese culture and its institution.  
Those phenomena imply that when the difference among Muslims 
is lesser and the gap between Islamic society and Javanese culture is 
greater, at that moment multiculturalism space becomes narrower. 
When there is no certain mechanism which enables dialogue between 
communities, the narrowness of multiculturalism will enlarge potency 
of conflict between groups, either between Muslims and non-Muslims, 
or between modernist and traditionalist Muslims. 
Conclusion 
Social diversity, either ethnic, culture, or religion, receives less 
attention from the preachers in various jama>` ah. Religious preaching 
emphasizes more on moral, `iba>dah, and `aqi >dah as a response to 
phenomena of moral decline, such as corruption, robbery, and various 
immoral acts, so that various jama>` ahs aim to raise morality (piety) by 
practicing Islamic teaching consequently as priority. 
With regard to few multicultural values, there are religious 
preaching materials which can be categorized as anti-multiculturalism, 
such as self-righteousness, prejudice and stereotype about other groups 
of society, in the context of relation with non-Muslim and Western 
countries, especially the United States and Australia. Non-Muslims are 
often considered as unbelievers (kuffa>r), musyriki >n (polytheists), Jews, 
and Christians.  
Materials of religious preaching imply that there is an increase on 
intensity of purification movement of Islamic teaching. This 
movement experiences higher level of intensity at the end of 21st 
century which then crystallized by popularizing “al-Salaf al-Salih”. 
There is also a process of “salafi mainstreaming” through various 
religious preaching—of four jama>` ah—and spreading their preachers to 
any other jama>` ah. In this way, ideology of Salafi develops to the other 
jama>` ah. Along with the increasing of the intensity, religious preaching 
also implies resistance to Javanese culture, assumed to have big role in 
“contaminating” the purity of Islam.  
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Finally, the development of Islam in Indonesia shows the tendency 
of radicalization indicated by hostility and hatred speeches to certain 
groups and ptactices assumed as the threat to Islam. These groups and 
practices include local culture (considered as source of takhayyul, 
heresy, and superstition), foreign nation (assumed to be identical to 
West, especially the US and Australia, which become the source of 
secularism, pluralism, and liberalism), and non-Muslim communities 
(assumed to be identical to the Jews and Christians).[] 
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